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Abstract. A systematic tool-based method is outlined that raises ques-
tions about the circumstances surrounding an incident: why it happened
and what went wrong. The approach offers a practical and systematic
way to apply a distributed cognition perspective to incident investiga-
tions, focusing on how available information resources (or the lack of
them) may shape user action, rather than just on causal chains. This
perspective supports a deeper understanding of the more systemic causes
of incidents. The analysis is based on a higher order-logic model describ-
ing how information resources may have influenced the actions of those
involved in the incident. The PVS theorem proving system is used to
identify situations where available resources may afford unsafe user ac-
tions. The method is illustrated using a healthcare case study.
Keywords: Theorem proving, incident analysis, socio-technical system.
1 Introduction and motivation
We explore whether automated reasoning tools, like PVS [10], informed by a dis-
tributed cognition perspective can lead to a cost effective approach that can help
investigators improve their awareness about the circumstances surrounding an
incident. Distributed cognition [5] explains how people within a socio-technical
system use information resources to support their actions and achieve their goals.
These information resources may be external (on pieces of paper, signs, com-
puters) or internal (in the head). Understanding how they are deployed and
transformed as people perform actions helps to understand the socio-techinical
system and what might have led to an incident.
We illustrate our proposed method with a medical incident example. It is
based on a comprehensive investigation report [2]. The analysis demonstrates
that additional, and potentially error-inducing conditions not envisaged in the
original report can be identified.
Contribution. We: (i) demonstrate how a distributed cognition perspective
could help investigators understand the circumstances surrounding an incident.
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In particular we focus on how the availability of internal and external information
resources (or the lack of them) may shape user action. (ii) illustrate how the
built-in PVS type-checking mechanism can be used to challenge investigators
about their reconstruction of facts.
2 The proposed approach for incident investigation
We explore how an automated reasoning tool like PVS can be used systematically
to help investigators understand the contributing factors of an incident by (i)
making explicit their conjectures about the availability and use of resources;
(ii) supporting an exploration of the validity of the logical argument about how
resources are used; (iii) challenging the validity of possible recommendations
aimed at avoiding the recurrence of such incidents.
Distributed cognition for incident investigation. We propose a con-
structive method to incident investigation informed by distributed cognition. In
particular this perspective suggests focussing on information resources and their
transformation. The method therefore involves the following steps: (1) modeling
information resources used by those involved in the incident (e.g., infusion rate
printed on a medication order); (2) modeling how information resources propa-
gate within the system (e.g., how a medication order is entered into the phar-
macy information system); (3) formulating and verifying conjectures about how
resources were used (e.g., were relevant resources available at critical moments
to relevant actors) and facts about the prescribed use of information resources
(e.g., according to procedures and regulations).
Related work. Our approach is not intended to replace existing accident
analysis methods. Rather it can be used in a complementary way to further
improve the investigators’ awareness about the circumstances surrounding an
incident, enhancing the final recommendations. A variety of techniques have
been proposed for conducting incident analysis. Johnson’s substantial and sys-
tematic review of the topic covers many of the more mature techniques [7].
Using formal descriptions of incidents is not a new idea. For example, Ladkin’s
Why-Because analysis [8] uses formal proofs to verify the correctness and com-
pleteness of the causal argument hypothesised by the investigator. Petri Nets
have also been used effectively to describe the path towards an incident. A com-
prehensive overview of formal methods for incident investigation can be found
in [6]. Leveson [9], Hollnagel [4] and others critique these approaches because
they are largely based on event chains and because inappropriate classifications
can bias the analysis. Leveson’s STAMP approach aims to overcome some of the
perceived deficiencies enabling an exploration of how constraints are propagated
systemically and contribute to the circumstances of the incident.
3 Illustrative example
Our example is based on a comprehensive accident report concerning an intra-
venous infusion pump [2]. Documented incidents with a range of infusion pumps
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Fig. 1. Reproduction of the label and of the pump used in the incident [2].
show that the wrong drug, or the wrong volume at the wrong rate, may have
disastrous consequences for the patient to whom the infusion was being admin-
istered [3]. In this case a pump that delivered a drug dose over a period of time
to treat a patient in an oncology out-patients unit was programmed incorrectly.
The events relevant to this incident included the prescription of the medication
at the pharmacy; transferring the prescription to the out-patients unit; one nurse
using the label attached to the drug bag to program the infusion pump; another
nurse cross-checking, and commencement of the infusion process.
We explored the circumstances surrounding the incident by producing a PVS
higher-order logic model, then used PVS methodically to explore the facts and
events. Questions raised by the analysis that cannot be answered through the
report highlight aspects that may have warranted further investigation. Our
complete PVS specification is available at [1]. We focus here for the purposes of
illustration on one part of the incident.
3.1 Modeling information resources
Resource identification allows the analyst to externalize facts about the informa-
tion that is available to the actors. Each resource is modeled using a different PVS
datatype. The PVS predicate subtyping language mechanism which restricts the
domain of already defined data-types is used extensively in our specifications.
When using expressions with subtypes, PVS automatically generates proof obli-
gations. They identify type correctness conditions (TCCs) to ensure the valid
use of the type. By this means issues in the incident may be highlighted.
We start to identify information resources through the “initial understand-
ing” of the incident described in the report: a nurse mistakenly programmed the
infusion pump with the wrong rate (28.8 mL/h instead of 1.2 mL/h).
The report notes that a label attached to the drug bag was used to program
the pump. This printed label specified: unit of delivery, concentration, rate, and
volume to be infused (see Figure 1). Further details are in the incident report [2].
The label provides information resources. It is modelled using a record type [#
a: A, b: B, ... #]. Each field represents a distinct information resource.
label_th: THEORY BEGIN
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drug_name_type: TYPE = { fluorouracil, cisplatin, %... }
rate_type: DATATYPE BEGIN mL_Xh(val: real, unit: nat): mL_Xh? END rate_type
% ...
bag_label_type: TYPE =
[# drug_name : drug_name_type,
% ...
rate_mL_24h : rate_type,
rate_mL_h : rate_type, % ... #]
END label_th
The label specification models the multiple fields contained in the bag label. If
different resources can be specified with the same type, then such resources are
potentially either replicated or have compatible content (e.g., in terms of values
and/or units) but different meaning. Either case could lead to confusion. Check-
ing such type matches can thus reveal potential issues that may warrant further
investigation. In the incident being analyzed, the bag label contained informa-
tion resources (rate, dose, among others) specified multiple times in different
formats. According to the report, this seemed to be the direct cause of the inci-
dent. One field on the label was used incorrectly in preference to another: “The
calculated rate (28.8 mL/h) was observed to match a number on the pharmacy
label.” ([2], page 13).
The pump contains information resources including the displays, labels that
may have been attached to the pump, and audible alarms. Similarly to the
bag label, the pump can be modelled as a record type, pump type (not shown
here, available from [1]). The predicate subtype used in each field reflects the
constraints imposed by the pump on such information resource.
3.2 Modeling transformations of information resources
Transformations are modeled as functions over resources. PVS generates proof
obligations to ensure correct use of types. Discharging a proof obligation chal-
lenges the investigator’s reconstruction of events and facts. Modeling the trans-
formations helps the investigators to be clear about relations that hold among
resources. Building a specification that correctly type-checks in the presence of
these transformations can therefore help identify when and in what form re-
sources are needed. An example transformation is the use of the information
resources printed on the bag label by the nurse to enter the rate into the pump.
Consider the information resource “rate”. The constraints imposed by the bag la-
bel can be naturally modelled as a PVS datatype (rate type, defined in theory
label th) with constructor mL Xh(val: real, unit: nat). The pump rate,
on the other hand, is simply a non-negative real number below a maximum
value (rate type, defined as { x: nonneg real | x <= max rate } in theory
pump th). The transformation function is:
enter_rate(rate: label_th.rate_type): pump_th.rate_type = val(rate)
PVS generates a proof obligation to ensure the correct use of types:
enter_rate_TCC: OBLIGATION
FORALL (rate: label_th.rate_type): val(rate) >= 0 AND val(rate) <= max_rate;
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In order to discharge this proof obligation, we need to show that the label rate
ranges over values that can be entered in the pump — the pump rate is a bounded
real number. This proof obligation, with the available information, cannot be
discharged — the rate specified on the bag label is unbounded. Although math-
ematically trivial it highlights implications for the incident investigation that are
potentially significant. In fact it raises the question: What are the constraints on
the rate value printed on the label? If answers are not available then this may
suggest a weakness in the system and a potential for unsafe workarounds. The
proof obligation also stimulates further investigation about rate value bounds:
What is the procedure in practice when a nurse has to program a pump and the
label indicates values that cannot be entered? These issues were not covered in
the incident report [2].
3.3 Conjectures about the use of information resources
Conjectures about the actual or prescribed use of information resources can be
formulated as predicates over resources. They can be embedded in the spec-
ification of information resources – PVS then systematically generates proof
obligations that ensure the conjectures hold.
One significant aspect of the incident was the safe limit of administration
for the drug. A reasonable conjecture is that the resources available to the
nurse provided appropriate information about safe infusion rates. The predicate
subtype for the infusion rate in the label is {r: rate type | safe rate?(r,
drug name)}, where drug name is another information resource provided by the
label (PVS allows the specification of dependent subtypes). Instantiating the
label (see Figure 1) automatically generates the proof obligation:
fluorouracil_bag_label_TCC: OBLIGATION safe_rate?(mL_Xh(28.8, 24), fluorouracil);
Given available information resources, this proof obligation cannot be dis-
charged. Neither the label nor the pump provides information about safe limits.
A bag label reporting safe limits could have helped the nurses or the patient
catch the mistake, e.g., while reviewing the therapy parameters — recognition
and pattern matching over recall from memory. Similarly, a pump with safe-
guards would have prompted a warning and, thus, could have helped catch the
mistake. This seems to be a real problem in the incident: “The calculation was
not validated with a mental approximation” ([2], page 18). A similar issue due
to the propagation of information resources from the medication order to the
computerised physician order entry can be highlighted with this approach. This
issue is not explicitly covered in the incident report [2], though the report points
out that “a miscalculation occurred when the pharmacist initially reviewed the
order in the clinic” ([2], page 33).
4 Conclusions
This brief illustration indicates that applying a distributed cognition perspective
to incident analysis can lead to insight that would help guide an incident inves-
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tigator. Missing insight could of course just mean that this particular report was
weak rather than our method useful. However, we argue that the method found
issues beyond that related to direct causes of the particular incident. Insight
can also relate to other issues that could lead to future mishaps. A traditional
causal analysis method as used does not aim to highlight such issues. They
would only be found through craft skill not the method. Our technique shares
with STAMP [9] the notion that incident analysis is about discovering systemic
failures rather than focusing on causal chains. In future work we do however need
to carry out more case studies to further explore the benefits of our approach.
We showed that a relatively simple use of a theorem prover can support
this analysis. In the illustration sub-typing alone was used to raise issues and
questions and it was not necessary for the analyst to formulate theorems. The
analyst just models the incident using PVS to frame their understanding. The
tool automatically produces the obligations and proof attempts, demonstrating
the satisfaction or otherwise of predefined constraints. As more information is
uncovered and modeled further proof obligations raise issues that may warrant
further investigation or lead to further recommendations.
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